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Abstract—The use of Shibboleth as a mechanism for im-
plementing federated authentication is commonplace in many
countries. The ability of Shibboleth to transmit extra informa-
tion about a user, including licenses, roles and other attributes,
is not exploited for many reasons, mainly because institional
Identity Providers (IdPs) are not maintainable sources of fine-
grained authorisation information. The JISC-funded Shintau
project has produced an extension to the Shibboleth profile
which allows a user to link information from more than one IdP
together utilising a custom Linking Service (LS). This paper
describes both the application and independent evaluation of
this software by the National e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the
University of Glasgow within the context of the ESRC-funded
Data Management through e-Social Science (DAMES) project.
Keywords-Shibboleth, Shintau, authorisation, attribute ag-
gregation, SAML
I. INTRODUCTION
The e-Social Science domain is providing numerous chal-
lenges in secure data access and management. Some of the
most important resources for studying the lives of citizens
require stringent technical procedures to be followed in order
to gain access, often with some sort of legal obligation that
needs to be enforced. This is especially true with regard to
the historic primary source of a nation’s demographic - a full,
national census [1]. In the UK these are carried out every
ten years, with the next (and allegedly the last) scheduled
for 2011. The results of the census may be made public with
multiple granularities of access and usage, from key statistics
that paint a picture of general trends across the country
that are freely available for download, down to individual-
level microdata which may be regarded as ”disclosing” and
thus should only be made available under strict terms and
conditions. The typical end-user experience for acquiring
this data starts with a visit to the data centre’s web site.
Here it will be necessary to register a username, normally
a valid email address, and password as an authentication
token. Sometimes the only check on this token is to look
up the fact that the email is valid, or is an email from
an academic institution. Next the user will be required to
select which data sets are of interest to them out of a list of
available downloads. The next step is for the data centre
to perform an authorisation, which takes the form of an
End User License Agreement (EULA) type statement which
the user is required to accept, specifying the conditions
upon which the data is offered and any obligations, legal
or otherwise, which the user is required to undertake. For
more disclosing data sets, this download is currently limited,
with many organisations insisting on extra restrictions on
access and usage. This can for example through demanding
the user physically attend a secure location where this data
can be accessed and used (subject to numerous previous
checks justifying why this access is needed). They are often
monitored when such data access and usage is undertaken.
This, whilst offering a secure access and usage model places
obvious constraints on the end user community and thus
minimizes the research possibilities that these data sets
provide.
Figure 1 shows and example of the special conditions
which are available at one such data provider - the Casweb
data archive [2]. These restrictions state, for example, how
securely the user will have to store the downloaded data, and
also whether results extracted from these data sets may be
externally published. One of the key challenges with these
procedures is how to make the agreements or licences that
a user has signed up to available for an external automated
process such as a web portal. This is especially so when
different data sets from different data providers each with
their own security and licensing agreements, need to be
supported and adhered to. This is a common occurrence for
researchers wishing to access individual-level social, clinical
and other more sensitive data resources for example. Thus
whilst the model described above is essentially interactive,
requiring a user visit a particular web site, sign up to the
terms and conditions, then download and store the data
themselves, a far better solution is to support user-oriented
access to and usage of a multitude of security-oriented
data resources from a range of data providers, where each
provider is still autonomous and able to define and enforce
the local terms and conditions on access and usage of their
data sets. This a key demand from data providers in the
Data Management through e-Social Science (DAMES) [3]
project.
User management for large-scale projects or resources
carries large administrative burdens on collaborating centres.
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The establishment of a user’s identity, the maintenance of
that identity and the allocation and revocation of privileges
and licenses comprise a heavy workload that requires ded-
icated persons to be employed at institutions. If centres
insist on maintaining credentials for any external users who
access their systems, there will come a point where the
administrative workload will become too great. In addition,
the authenticity of these users is hard to establish if they
are based at remote institutions. In the past ten years, there
has been a paradigm shift towards the concept of feder-
ated identity and access management infrastructures. This
allows a group of establishments such as higher education
institutions to agree to form a federation of trusted sites
who place trust in the identity assertions of the individual
collaborating sites. From an end user perspective, this allows
a user wishing to access a service/resource available through
the federation to loginusing only their local credentials. Once
authenticated, these credentials can subsequently be used
to access other resources available through the federation
without further authentication challenge/responses - known
as Single Sign-On (SSO). Numerous gains are made through
collaboration based on such federations: institutions will
only have to manage their local users as they have always
done, plus end users will only have to manage one set of
credentials to access a whole range of resources which would
otherwise need their own usernames, passwords etc. In the
United Kingdom, the UK Access Management Federation
[4] is responsible for registering entities and maintaining
metadata. These infrastructures work well when all the home
institution needs to do is release an authentication statement
about a user. Releasing extra information, in particular what
privileges or licenses they hold on other systems is a more
complicated scenario, made difficult by the fact that licenses
are often held by external authorities (generally the resource
host) and the management of user authorisation which may
change on a day-to-day basis is not something that home
Figure 1. The CASWEB Special Conditions Interface
institutions is rightly able to undertake.
The ESRC-funded DAMES project is a three-year project
looking at social science data management activities relating
to occupation, education, ethnicity and clinical/e-Health and
wider social care data sets. Data management challenges
faced in the social sciences are numerous: investigation of
trends in data over decades (longitudinal studies) where
different coding systems and classifications and categorisa-
tions have been defined and used by the community, e.g.
regional boundaries of local authorities change over time and
understanding this when dealing with changing population
dynamics or the change/impact upon local, regional and
national health policy, is essential to guide policy and
aid understanding of issues impacting upon society more
generally.Many of these data challenges implicitly require
interfacing and access to data from other disciplines, e.g. the
clinical domain, the geospatial domain, economic domain
etc. As noted access to many of the key data sets in
this context is especially fraught, where restrictions and
obligations on the user is mandatory. Solutions that help
to simplify this overall process for end users and capturing
the autonomy and access control demanded by the data
providers and associated stakeholders themselves are thus
highly sought after.
This paper describes the utilisation of the recently released
ShinTau middleware [5] that enables a user to create a linked
set of external licenses, permissions and roles that will allow
them to access multiple secure data sets available through
the DAMES web portal adhering to a strict security policy.
This infrastructure aims to augment federated authentication
now widely adopted across the community through the UK
Access Management Federation for example, with federated
authorization whereby users are able to manage multiple
credentials from multiple authorities in a seamless manner. A
key motivation behind this is to minimize the effort required
by both the end users and the data providers themselves.
II. TECHNOLOGIES
The ShinTau infrastructure relies on several widely avail-
able user and access management technologies. These will
be described in the following section, with the final subsec-
tion describing the ShinTau software itself.
A. Shibboleth
The Shibboleth [6] implementation of the Security As-
sertion Markup Language (SAML) has become the de
facto standard in implementing federated access control to
web resources, particularly in the higher/further education
domain. In exploiting this software, national-level resource
providers may delegate their user authenication (and trust)
requirements to their national federation. This federation
is responsible for registering and maintaining entities who
wish to collaborate in this trust network, ensuring that
Service Providers (SPs) have access to fully accountable
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Identity Providers (IdPs). This infrastructure works well
when resources require merely a confirmation of a user’s
status within an organisation, or a statement of authenticity
that ensures the person accessing the service is who they
say they are.
The SAML specification allows for extra information to
be asserted about an individual, so that further decisions on
their privilege on a given resource may be made. The eduPer-
son specification [7] defines a set of standard user attributes
which federations may adopt to ensure a basic minimum of
information is released about a user for proper accountability
and auditing. In the UK, institutional IdPs have been found
to reliably release only two of the eduPerson attributes,
namely eduPersonAffiliation and eduPersonTargetedId. The
former attribute is a scoped statement of a user’s status
within the institution they have credentials for, for example,
a student at the University of Glasgow would find this attri-
bute populated by the value student@gla.ac.uk. Scoped, in
this sense, means the location-specific information appended
to the attribute - in this case ‘gla.ac.uk’. Any SP receiving
this attribute can be assured (to the extent of the trust model
underlying the federation itself) that the person logging in
using the credentials that generated the assertion is a student
of the University of Glasgow. The latter attribute mentioned
above, eduPersonTargetedId, is a non-disclosing hash that
has a unique and stateful value for a particular user trying
to access a particular SP logging in from a particular IdP.
This attribute may be used to identify a returning user to a
resource without disclosing information such as first name,
date of birth, etc. In this way, anonymous access to web
resources is possible, because whilst the SAML assertion
confirms the identity of the user, the assertion contains no
disclosing information.
The eduPerson specification defines several other at-
tributes for transmission, but these are not well supported
across all IdPs in a federation due to concerns about privacy.
One of interest is eduPersonEntitlement, which is an attri-
bute which may take values which can be used to authorise
further actions on a resource. For example, a portal may
request that an entitlement value which represents ‘portal
administrator’ should be asserted before access to specific
content is granted. The main difference between this attribute
and the two eduPerson attributes described previously is
that eduPersonEntitlement is likely to contain values that
may change fairly frequently, as resources with different
requirements come and go or alter their demands. The
eduPersonAffiliation and eduPersonTargetedId attributes are,
by contrast, essentially static based on whatever database is
providing the user information. So administration of these
two common attributes is easy and supported by nearly all
IdPs, however support for eduPersonEntitlement is generally
not given because of the administration and accounting costs.
In order to release this attribute, sites would have to manage
the changeable, day-to-day authorisation tokens required by
users on systems that they themselves have no authority
to issue. Thus the University of Glasgow should not issue
authorization tokens granting access to the UK Census for
example, unless specifically delegated the task by the UK
Census data providers. Software to support such delegation
of authority was described in [8] and applied in [9].
B. PERMIS
PERMIS [10] is a generic authorisation infrastructure
which issues roles and privileges to users using X.509
[11] Attribute Certificates and subsequently uses them to
enforce authorisation policy. PERMIS provides a plug-in
authorisation enforcement point (PEP), and tools with which
to issue ACs and write local security policies. A security
policy is a document (typically written in XML) that details
the precise access control requirements of a resource. In
PERMIS, policy definition and enforcement use an XML
triple comprising a Role, Action & Target. For many pur-
poses, the Role is contained within an X.509 Attribute
Certificate (AC) [12] which the user provides directly or
through extraction of the Distinguished Name (DN) and
subsequent LDAP lookup. The Target represents the URI of
the Grid/Web service which the user is attempting to access,
and the Action is the individual method that the user is
attempting to invoke on this target. The XML policy dictates
which combinations of Action and Target are permitted
based on the Role that the user presents in their AC.
Additional rules about which PKI keypairs are recognised
by the PERMIS PDP, which certificate DNs are permitted
and their validity time can be expressed in the XML policy.
All objects in PERMIS are digitally signed, ensuring the
information hasn’t been tampered with, and allowing the
issuer of the certificate/policy to be confirmed. PERMIS also
supports associated tools to help in this process including an
Attribute Certificate Manager and Policy Editor.
The PERMIS module used for the ShinTau demonstration
is the PERMIS Shibboleth Apache Authorisation Module
(SAAM) [13], which is a plug-in for Apache Web Server
that allows locations within the Apache configuration to be
protected by PERMIS. A modified version of the PERMIS
decision engine was used as the Policy Information Point
responsible for collecting attributes from the remote IdPs.
C. ShinTau
The Information Systems Security Research Group at
the University of Kent have developed the ShinTau [14]
infrastructure for enriching the attribute sets that a vanilla
Shibboleth installation provides, addressing the concerns
over privileges or licenses required for external resource
access as discussed in the previous section. The Shintau
architecture was informed by a requirements gathering ex-
ercise during 2007 [15]. The implementation of ShinTau
consists of a standard Shibboleth SP protecting web content
hosted in Apache Web Server, with an extra directive to
543
allow authorisation on the protected area to be performed
by a policy-enforcing PERMIS application. Note here that
the SP is the only unmodified Shibboleth entity in the
infrastructure. In order to achieve user-instigated attribute
linkage, a new entity within the SAML profile is required
called a Linking Service (LS). This is a PHP-based web
application that allows users to log in to (ShinTau-enabled)
IdPs and create mappings between SPs and multiple IdPs.
The Linking Service contains a novel metadata entry that
behaves like a hybrid IdP and SP, unfortunately the use of
the extra extensions (Liberty Alliance End Point Reference)
means that the UK Access Management Federation refuse
to add entities like this(and the modified IdPs) to their
federation metadata. Because of this, the testshib.org test
federation was used for all implementation work.
The Shintau infrastructure calls for the user to first create
the IdP mappings in the LS. This requires the user to
have some knowledge of which attributes are required for
a particular service. In some cases the SP will inform the
user of the access requirements, and in some this may be
less visible. The point being that the user is the person
in control over the composition of the attribute set that is
finally presented to the SP. It is important to note that at
this stage the user cannot dictate precisely which attributes
are presented by a single IdP, this is beyond the scope of
influence of the user and is set in the IdP’s Attribute Release
Policy which is managed by the IdP’s administrator. Rather,
the user can manage the union of multiple IdPs to create a
merged set of capabilities, which may include permissions
beyond those which the SP requires. For example, it would
be expected that a portal making use of census data would
not require access to every piece of data that the user had
signed the agreements to. In the case of an institutional IdP
this problem is unlikely to be a factor, for the administrative
reasons outlined earlier. However, a data provider making
its user licenses available to SPs through a custom IdP will
probably populate an attribute assertion with every license
the user holds as there exists no current mechanism to select
these attributes other than for the SP to filter the incoming
statement accordingly.
IdPs are accessed through the Shintau Linking Service’s
”Link Account” function. This function redirects the user to
the Shibboleth Where Are You From (WAYF) service where
the user is prompted to select the IdP of interest from a
list of the federation members. Upon selection, the user is
redirected to the IdP to login using the credentials required
at that site. Once the user has successfully authenticated at
the IdP, they are returned to the Linking Service, where the
persistent details of that login session are stored in a database
and displayed to the user in a table. Each subsequent
authentication to a federation IdP will result in the persistent
details being fetched from that IdP and added to the linkage
table. Once the user has logged in to all the IdPs they need
to extract information from, the next step is to associate all
or a subset of these IdPs with a particular federation SP. The
Linking Service ”Release Policy” configuration function is
used for this purpose. This function allows a user to select
all or a subset of the IdPs they have just registered and
map them as being available to an individual federation
SP (which will typically require authorisation information
available from multiple sources of authority). This can be
done for as many SPs as the user requires.
Once the link between multiple IdPs and SP has been
made, secure information from multiple sources of authority
(IdP) is available for a PERMIS service running on the SP
to access the IdPs attribute assertions through the Liberty
Alliance Discovery Service. This action is triggered when
visiting the SP, where the user is immediately sent to the
WAYF to select their primary IdP (usually an institutional
IdP with high user accountability). The user provides their
credentials as normal, but before submitting them, they
are offered an extra check box on the IdP login page to
”Aggregate Attributes”. This tells the user that the final
attribute assertions will not all come directly from this
IdP, but some will come from the Linking Service which
fetches the authorization credentials available to the SP
being accessed and checks the user mappings to see which
IdPs have been marked as sources of user information for
this particular SP. The Linking Service then coordinates the
attribute retrieval from each IdP for the PERMIS SAAM
service to subsequently use to enforce access and authoriza-
tion policy, e.g. to check the validity of the attributes and
fulfillment of all local access and usage policies associated
with the SP. If the correct merged attribute set has arrived
at the SP, the PERMIS PDP grants access to the SP. If
the policy has not been satisfied by the attribute aggregate,
the user is denied access. In this manner, multiple user-
selected attribute authorities can be used to make single
access control decisions to providers requiring attributes
from a variety of sources of authority. This model is essential
in security-focused domains where data providers demand
finer-grained access control.
III. DAMES USE CASE
The ESRC-funded DAMES project has been ongoing
since January 2008. The project has developed a portfolio
of specialist data environments focused on specific social
science themes:
• Grid-enabled Occupational Data Environment
(GEODE) - which has developed an environment
for research into the data challenges associated with
occupational data resources [16];
• Grid-enabled Minority Data Environment (GEMDE)
- for data challenges associated with ethnicity and
minority related data resources - [17];
• Grid-enabled Education Data Environment (GEEDE)
- for data challenges associated with education and
qualification related data resources [18];
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Figure 2. The DAMES portal e-Health Portlets for Depression, Self Harm
and Suicide Related Research
• e-Health specialist data environment - which has estab-
lished an environment for a range of e-Health related
research topics with specific focus on inter-disciplinary
research challenges.
The DAMES e-Health related environment has acute
demands on security, especially since it is dealing with data
from organisations such as the National Health Service, the
Census and license protected geospatial data sets. The e-
Health environment has focused in particular on supporting
research into depression, self-harm and suicide.
As shown in Figure 2, several portlets are available within
the DAMES portal hosted at Glasgow that can in principal
be used to provide access to sensitive data. This includes
three portlets that provide access to Scottish Morbidity
Records (SMR) covering hospital admissions; mental health
and psychosis data, and death related data. These data sets
currently comprise 4-million records and have been released
under strict access and usage terms and conditions from
the NHS in the UK. A further portlet has been created and
offers an accessor function for Census key statistics extracted
from MIMAS (Manchester) [19]. A final portlet provides
an accessor for geospatial shapefiles hosted by EDINA
(Edinburgh) [20]. Figure 2 shows the e-Health portlets in
the DAMES portal, which communicate with the Census
data server through a GT4 Grid Service. The more general
usage and science that is supported by this environment is
described in [21], [22].
For the ShinTau evaluation on access to and use of
the DAMES portal, a demonstration involving 10 social
scientists and software engineers was carried out. The first
part of this was to establish an instruction manual describing
the process of access and usage of the DAMES portal
through ShinTau. We note that given the sensitivity of
the NHS data, this scenario focused on the social and
Figure 3. Shintau Linking Service with all three IdPs merged.
geospatial domains, however the solution is generic and can
exploit a multitude of attribute authorities. Three Shintau-
enabled IdPs were created beforehand, each issuing either an
authentication assertion or authorisation attributes according
to the following list:
• Glasgow - Primary authentication IdP acting as the
home institution;
• Edinburgh - EDINA: Geospatial Data License provider;
• Manchester - MIMAS: Census Data License provider.
At the portal side, the ShinTau-enabled PERMIS SAAM
module was deployed and configured with an XML policy
which granted access to the portal pages provided the user
managed to assert not only an authentication assertion from
the Glasgow IdP, but also a geospatial license from EDINA
and a Census Data license from MIMAS. Figure 4 shows
the flow of user attributes used in the test environment.
The objective of the end-user demonstration was to
explore user experiences with configuring and using the
Shintau Linking Service so that the conditions demanded by
the DAMES portal were satisfied. Each user first logged into
the Linking Service using their primary authentication IdP
(Glasgow). This allowed them access to the attribute map-
ping functions of the Linking Service. Each user then added
the other two IdPs to their Linking Service mapping account
by logging into the EDINA and MIMAS IdPs respectively.
Once the three IdPs had been associated, the final step was
to choose the SP that this mapping referred to, namely the
DAMES portal SP, and commit the mapping to this SP
as shown in Figure 3. This ended the user configuration
section of the demonstration, and the users then tested the
association to see if they could gain access to the secure
DAMES portal. Upon visiting the DAMES SP, the user was
required to stipulate in a checkbox whether or not they were
using ShinTau aggregation on this SP. If this option was
not chosen, then when the user logged into the primary
Glasgow IdP as normal and was forwarded to the portal,
then the PERMIS authorisation policy would establish that
insufficient information was provided (i.e. the extra licenses
from EDINA and MIMAS were not provided). Repeating
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Figure 4. Flow of Information from the Primary IdP which acts as the Authentication Authority, and the Two Extra Attribute Authorities (EDINA and
MIMAS) needed to access the Shintau-protected DAMES portal
this part of the demonstration, but having the users select the
ShinTau aggregation option, caused the PERMIS module to
refer to the two other IdPs which the user had previously
linked using the Linking Service and subsequently returns
any necessary attributes held about the user. Assuming that
the linking of the three IdPs has been done successfully
in the Linking Service by the end user, then the DAMES
portal security policy is satisfied, i.e. all sufficient licenses
are present, and the user may access the portal itself and
view the portlet interfaces shown in Figure 2.
As part of this evaluation, a user questionnaire was filled
out by most of the participants (9 responded), and the results
collated at the University of Kent [23]. The questionnaire
queried the user’s understanding of the process, its usability,
the user’s own view on attribute release methods, the soft-
ware packaging itself and finally some general comments.
For each question the user graded each answer on a Likert-
type 7-point scale. A summary of the responses revealed the
following trends:
• Almost all respondents understood (at least slightly) the
principals behind the software;
• All respondents completed the demo without requiring
additonal assistance;
• All but one of the respondents understood the meaning
of each stage in the demonstration;
• Most users (76%) found the Linking Service easy, or
very easy to use;
• Around half felt they could subsequently use the service
without the manual;
• A slight majority thought that Shintau should be in-
cluded with the Shibboleth distribution.
The main themes which became obvious from the re-
sponses are that the user-friendliness should be one of the
driving forces in any changes to the architecture. The general
feeling was that Shintau effectively tackled the problem
of federated authorisation. Through the general comments
section, many users expressed an interest in being able
to choose which attributes from a specific IdP should be
asserted and which shouldn’t. It should be noted that this
kind of operation would break the privacy model of the
Linking Service, as at its heart the Linking Service has
been designed not to have any knowledge of the contents
of attributes sets, it should only know how to reliably assert
them.
IV. ISSUES
The installation of the ShinTau infrastructure was very
complicated, requiring a host of dependent applications to
be configured and running before interoperation was possi-
ble. To illustrate the dependencies, a ShinTau-enabled IdP
requires the following components to be created, configured
and started:
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• Public Key Infrastructure was set up - Standard issue
JANET certificates were obtained;
• Apache Ant, Tomcat (with manager account activated),
Axis, Web Server and the latest Java JDK were in-
stalled;
• SSL (using the JANET certs) was set up in Apache
Web Server, and a ProxyPass directive used to forward
requests to Tomcat;
• The Shintau IdP and Liberty Alliance Discovery Ser-
vice were installed;
• The Shibboleth Security provider was appended to the
standard Java security provider list;
• An LDAP server to host the user database was created,
with extra schema to handle permisRole and X.509
ACs;
• The ShinTau IdP was configured to use the testshib
metadata federation;
• A full Postgres database was installed and configured
to store the relations between IdPs and the Linking
Service;
• The Liberty Alliance Discovery Service was configured
to write/read from this database;
• A full list of all IdP and Linking Service endpoint
relations was loaded into the Postgres database.
Because the Shintau infrastructure requires heavily mod-
ified/augmented IdPs, the current implementation will not
interoperate with the UK Federation (and probably all
the other national federations) that are running unmodified
Shibboleth version 2. A method for adding a non-ShinTau
IdP to the infrastructure was discussed but never tested,
involving manipulation of the infrastructure databases.
V. CONCLUSION
The Shintau software provided by the University of Kent
ISSRG group is a standards-based implementation that ex-
tends the Shibboleth middleware to allow dynamic aggrega-
tion of user attributes and credentials through the creation
of a new profile entity known as a Linking Service. This
service allows a user to aggregate attributes and credentials
from multiple Identity Providers (IdPs), allowing access to
services that have access requirements that are not satisfied
by the information from a single IdP. This functionality is
crucial in the real world where multiple authorities and trust
relationships exist.
The application of this infrastructure to a real-life use-
case within the ESRC DAMES project was demonstrated
at the National e-Science Centre. The DAMES web portal
contained portlets that provide services making use of data
from external authorities, one a source of census data, and
the other a source of geospatial data. In the demonstration,
independent IdPs were set up representing these external
license providers, plus an institutional IdP. A group of 10
end users successfully used the Shintau software to access
a secure portal requiring authentication and authorisation
(licenses) information from three separate IdPs - proving the
architecture operates as intended. The users responded to a
detailed questionnaire that confirmed that every person who
attempted the demonstration was able to link the correct set
of attributes in order to access the service, despite layperson
knowledge of the technology and its purpose.
Ultimately however, secure access to a portal is only the
first stage in realizing the kinds of security models and
platforms supported through DAMES. It is highly unlikely
that data providers such as the NHS will delegate autho-
rization decisions to a portal hosted at NeSC in Glasgow.
Thus whilst they might assert that a user has a license
to access a particular data sets, they will also want to
make local authorization decisions. The SPAM-GP Attribute
Certificate Portlet allows for such scenarios to be realized
[24], however, the models of role based access control
also need to be augmented with wider security consider-
ations. For example, statistical risk disclosure when dealing
with data sets aggregated form multiple providers offers
numerous challenges and research possibilities. Many of
these are currently being explored within the context of the
Scottish Health Informatics Platform (www.scot-ship.ac.uk)
project and exploitation of the VANGUARD technology as
described in [25].
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